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Many workers reveal a preference for a gradual reduction in work hours as they approach
retirement (“phased retirement”), rather than a sudden change from full-time work to full-time
retirement.    Pension regulations may impede phased retirement without a switch of employers
by prohibiting access to pension assets.  This study uses Health and Retirement Survey data to
investigate the extent to which a gradual reduction in work hours is made difficult by pensions,
particularly defined benefit plans.   The study also explores other possible impediments to
phased retirement.
 1. Introduction.  
The transition into retirement is frequently thought of as a one-time event where a worker
switches from full-time employment to full-time retirement.   However, many workers gradually
reduce work hours as they make the transition into retirement.    This process of “phased
retirement” may involve a switch of employers, a switch to self-employment, or a change of
career.   
This paper investigates the claim that legislative restrictions on access to pension wealth
may impede phased retirement and cause workers to unnecessarily switch employers as they
phase into retirement.  Section 2 provides a brief review of existing literature on phased
retirement and a description of the pension regulations that could hamper a worker's desire to
pursue a phased retirement strategy.   Section 3  uses data from the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) to examine the frequency of phased retirement and how it interacts with pension coverage
and job-switching.    The multivariate analysis in section 4  illustrates that pension coverage
reduces the chance that a worker pursues a phased retirement strategy, but increases the chance
that a worker switches jobs to accommodate such desires.   Evidence also suggests that switching
jobs to pursue a phased retirement strategy can be quite costly in terms of earnings losses.  
2.  Background. 
Several studies illustrate that the transition into retirement frequently involves a spell of
part-time work or a switch of employers.   For example, Ruhm (1990) found that more than 60
percent of workers do not retire directly from their "career" job and over one-half had a spell of
1 partial retirement.
1   Also, less than 10 percent of workers partially retire without first leaving
their career job.   
Quinn (2000) estimates that at least one-third of men and one-half of women accept a
bridge job between their last “career job” and complete labor force withdrawal.
2   The study also
finds that many older Americans retire gradually, often using part-time jobs, bridge jobs, or
stints of self-employment on the path to retirement.   
The fact that many workers switch to part-time work as they make the transition into
retirement is consistent with stated worker preferences.   In a recent survey of workers
approaching retirement, nearly three-fourths report that they would prefer to reduce their work
hours gradually rather than retire abruptly [Graig and Pagenelli (2000)].    What is somewhat
surprising, however, is evidence that most workers switch jobs to accommodate a reduction in
work hours.   A switch of employers means that workers will incur search costs and may realize
a wage cut if they have job-specific skills.   In fact, Ruhm (1990) finds that a significant share of
workers who switch jobs as they approach retirement experience more than a 25 percent cut in
earnings and the earnings losses are especially pronounced for workers who simultaneously
change occupation and/or industry.
The reasons that employees switch employers to accommodate their preference for
reduced work hours can be divided into two broad categories.   First, employers may be
unwilling to allow their workers to switch to part-time work.  Second, workers may prefer to
switch employers as they reduce hours, even though the employer may have allowed a switch to
part-time work.
2 
2 Quinn defines a career job as a job that lasts at least 10 years in which the employee works at least 1600 hours
per year.  
1 Ruhm defines a career job as the longest  spell of employment with a single firm, up to and including the job
held at the start of the RHLS.There are several factors that may cause an employer to prefer full-time over part-time
workers.   First, quasi-fixed labor costs which depend on the number of workers and not the
number of hours per worker could drive up the cost of part-time labor relative to that for
full-time labor.
3  Examples of quasi-fixed costs include fringe benefits that have a fixed cost per
worker and training costs.  Consistent with theory, there is empirical evidence that training costs
and some fringe benefits reduce the fraction of workers who are employed part-time.
4 
A firm's production technology may also make employers prefer full-time workers. 
For example, some production processes require team effort in which coordination of work
across employees is important.    If the absence of one member of the team reduces productivity
substantially, part-time employees would be detrimental to productivity.   Alternatively, some
production processes have peak load problems that could be ameliorated with the use of
part-time employees (e.g. retail establishments).  Finally, if a job requires a substantial amount of
capital per worker, firms may be reluctant to allow part-time work since it may result in
expensive capital remaining idle.
While quasi-fixed costs or production technologies may cause employers to prefer a
single full-time worker over two half-time workers at the same hourly wage rate, if employees
are willing to take a sufficient reduction in the hourly wage in order to have a part-time work
schedule, the employer could be made indifferent between part-time and full-time workers.   
However, the greater the wage reduction necessary for the employer to agree to a part-time
schedule, the less likely part-time work will be agreeable to both parties.  In fact, it is quite
possible that the wage reduction necessary to make the employer indifferent between a part-time
3 
4 See, for example, Montgomery and Cosgrove (1993).   
3 Oi  (1962)  provides the seminal work on the role of quasi-fixed labor costs on labor  market outcomes.and full-time worker exceeds the wage cut that a worker would realize with a switch of
employers.
Consistent with the premise that employer willingness to offer part-time work to
employees varies across jobs are the large inter-industry differences in the fraction of workers
with part-time jobs (Fallick 1999).  For example, in retail trade, 40 percent of workers are
part-time employees; in mining, only 10 percent are part-time.  Also, Watson-Wyatt (2000) finds
that the availability of phased retirement programs allowing workers to reduce work varies
dramatically across industry and is most prevalent in the educational sector.  The study suggests
that phased retirement would be relatively easy in a college or university environment where a
professor could teach every other semester whereas it might be costly to accommodate such
schedules in other jobs.
Even when employers are willing to allow workers to reduce hours, employees may
choose to switch jobs as they reduce work hours for several reasons.   First, an employee may
wish to switch jobs to acquire a job with fewer fixed time or money costs.   An example of a
fixed time cost would be time spent traveling to and from work.   If a worker cuts from 8 to 4
hour days, the time cost of travel would be unaffected.   An example of a fixed money cost of
working would be the cost of clothing required for the job.  
Restricted access to pension assets is a second reason that employees may choose to
switch jobs as they phase into retirement.  A recent report on phased retirement submitted to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) Advisory Council outlines several ways
that restricted access to pension wealth impedes phased retirement.
5    First, if a worker is
included in a DB plan that calculates benefits on the participant’s final average pay, switching to
4 
5 Working Group Report (2000).part-time work may have severe consequences for the worker’s eventual retirement benefits.
6   
Second, in DC plans, tax law prohibits penalty-free distributions until age 59½ unless taken as an
annuity, as payments for an expected lifetime, or in the case of death or disability and workers
may have to terminate service with their employer to access pension assets even if they are over
age 59 1/2.    Profit sharing and stock bonus plans are allowed to give in-service distributions,
but not all do.   In-service distributions are prohibited in money purchase plans.  Fourth, current
regulations do not allow payment of DB pension benefits prior to a participant’s normal
retirement age unless there is a complete severance from employment with the plan sponsor.
Since wealth accrual in DB plans can drop off substantially after eligibility for early or normal
retirement benefits, some workers may find it beneficial to switch employers without any desire
to reduce hours merely to maximize the value of their pension.
7   Finally, some companies are
concerned that if they offer pension payouts on a phased-retirement basis, they might have
trouble passing some of the income-based nondiscrimination tests.
8
The major concern from a policy perspective is that pension regulations may be forcing
an inefficient turnover of workers as they phase into retirement.   Inefficiency would emerge if
workers switch into jobs where they are less productive and/or incur search costs to make the
5 
8 According to the Working Group Report on Phased Retirement, passage of nondiscrimination rules could be
made difficult by phased retirement because there is a higher concentration of highly compensated employees in the
older-age, longer-service categories and there are more highly compensated employees within the particular
category of workers whose skills an employer wants to retain by offering phased retirement (e.g., engineers).   
Consequently, the offer of phased retirement may not be uniform across groups of highly and non-highly
compensated employees.
7 Kotlikoff and Wise (1989) provide a good discussion of wealth accrual in DB plans and illustrate how pension
accrual rates spike at early and normal retirement ages.   Accrual rates can also turn negative after a worker becomes
eligible for benefits.   The logic is that after a worker becomes eligible to collect benefits, pension wealth will
increase only if the expected present value of any increment in the annual benefit is sufficient to offset the loss of a
year of benefits.
6 There is, however, substantial uncertainty over the legality of reducing benefits when a worker’s final average
pay declines.switch without any offsetting increase in productivity or improvement in the nonpecuniary
aspects of the job.   
3. The Transition into Retirement.
To test the hypothesis that pensions restrain phased retirement, this study uses data from
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).   The HRS started in 1992 and surveyed people born
between 1931 and 1941 and their spouses.   Information was gathered on issues related to health,
income, retirement and economic status.  Wave I of the HRS surveyed  12,652 people in 7,702
households.   Additional waves of the survey were completed every two years.   Our analysis
relies on waves one through four, which were completed in 1992, 1994, 1996 and 1998.
Since we are interested in the transition from full-time work to retirement, we restrict our
sample to people between the ages of 50 and 62 who were full-time wage and salary workers in
wave I.    Throughout this report, workers are defined as full-time if they work 35 or more hours
per week for 36 or more weeks per year on their primary jobs.   These workers are followed
through subsequent waves to track their change in work hours and employers.   Since there is
some attrition in the sample, people may be included in the panel for anywhere between one and
four waves.
Restricting the sample to full-time wage and salary workers between the ages of 50 and
62 in wave I yields 4,423  people in wave I.    By wave IV, the sample size drops to 3,440  
people.  The reduction in sample size results from the fact that the survey may have been unable
to obtain an interview from a household in later waves because it was not possible to locate the
household, someone died, or the household refused a follow-up interview.
6 Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the full-time wage and salary workers included
from Wave I. 
9    In Wave I, the average full-time wage and salary worker is 55.2 years old, has
12.8 years of education,  works 43.6 hours per week and 51.0 weeks per year, and has been with
the current employer for 14.7 years.   Men constitute 56.9 percent of the sample.   The
percentage of workers with pension coverage is 72.5.    If broken down by type of pension
coverage, 30.1 percent have only DB coverage; 22.1 percent have only DC coverage; and 20.4  
percent have a combination of DB and DC coverage (henceforth denoted as DBDC). 
10 
Evidence on the transition from full-time work to retirement is presented in table 2 where
the employment status of people who started as full-time wage and salary workers in wave I is
tracked in subsequent waves.  Among the workers that start as full-time wage and salary workers
in wave I, there is a gradual shift to either retirement or part-time work over time.  Among those
starting as full-time wage and salary workers in wave I, the percentage that are employed in later
waves falls from 100 percent in wave I to 66.3 percent by Wave IV.  Among those who continue
employment across waves,  there is a gradual reduction in work hours.  Between waves I and IV,
the percentage who are full-time workers drops from 100.0 percent in Wave I to 81.2 percent by
wave IV. 
If pensions impede phased retirement,  work hours among those who continue
employment should fall at a slower rate for workers who start with pension coverage.    To  
investigate this hypothesis, table 2 provides a breakdown of employment statistics by pension
status in wave I.    Several points are worth noting.  First, workers with DB or DBDC  plans are
more likely than others to stop working across waves.   Workers with DC plans or no pension
7 
10 Workers classified as having a combination of DB and DC coverage could either have multiple plans with at
least one being a DB and at least one being a DC, or a single pension plan that has both DB and DC features.  
9 The wave I sample size drops from 4,770 to 4,744 because observations with missing data on the variables listed
in table 1 are dropped from the sample.  coverage in wave I are fairly similar in terms of the chance that they stop working over the four
waves.   The fact that DB and DBDC workers are more likely to stop working across the waves
is consistent with  the prediction that DB plans encourage earlier retirements than DC plans.
11
Among workers who continue employment across waves, those who start with any type
of pension in wave I are less likely to switch from full-time to part-time work.  This is consistent
with the premise that pensions make it difficult for workers to phase into retirement.  
A difficulty with the above results is the fact that pension type in the first wave could be
correlated with the worker's age.  Consequently, differential changes in work hours across waves
could merely reflect differences in worker ages by pension type.    To address this issue, table 3
presents employment transitions based upon a worker's age and pension status in the prior wave.
 For workers who are full-time wage and salary workers in a given wave, transition rates into
full-time employment, part-time employment, and out of the labor force are estimated.
12   The
transition rates are calculated according to the worker's pension status in the first of  two
consecutive waves.  
For all people who were employed as full-time wage and salary workers in a given wave,
the fraction who continue as full-time workers diminishes with age while the fraction who switch
to part-time work or out of the labor force rises.    The percentage continuing in full-time work
drops from 88.1 percent among 50-54 year olds to 47.3 percent among workers aged 65 or more.
 The transition into part-time employment rises from 5.1 percent in the youngest age group to
14.3 percent in the oldest, and the transition to out of the labor force rises from 5.0 to 37.1
percent.  
8 
12 The three transition rates do not sum to 100 percent because a separate category was added for transition into
unemployment.   Since the percentage of workers making the transition into unemployment was less than 2 percent
for the vast majority of cases, the transition rates into unemployment are not reported for the sake of brevity.
11 See, for example, Friedberg and Webb (2000) .If pensions impede phased retirement,  pension coverage should be associated with a
lower transition rate to part-time employment.  This is precisely what the data suggest.  As
workers pass from the youngest (50-54) to oldest (65+) age group, the transition rate into
part-time work rises from 10.4 to 26.4 percent among workers without pension coverage.  The
transition rate into part-time employment also rises with age for workers with pension coverage,
but is much lower than that for workers without pension coverage.  For example, in the oldest
age group (65+), the part-time transition rate is 6.8 percent for DB workers; 13.8 percent for DC
workers; and 11.5 percent for DBDC workers, but 26.4 percent for workers without pension
coverage.   Hence, consistent with the premise that pensions hinder phased retirement, pension
coverage is associated with a lower transition rate into part-time work.  
Table 3 also presents transition rates from full-time work to out of the labor force.
13      
These statistics reveal rather stark differences in the transition rates from full-time work to
retirement (out of the labor force) across pension status.   Workers with DB or DBDC coverage
are the most likely to make a transition directly into retirement for workers aged 55 and above.   
Workers with DC coverage have transition rates into retirement that are fairly similar to workers
without any pension coverage.   This lends further support to the hypothesis that DC plans are
more "age-neutral" in terms of retirement incentives.  DB plans on the other hand, tend to
encourage retirement (or at least departure from the firm) when the worker reaches early or
normal retirement age.
14
If a worker with pension coverage wants to switch from full-time to part-time work,
access to pension assets may be essential to maintaining the same standard of living.    Since a
9 
14 This result is also consistent with Friedberg and Web (2000) who present empirical evidence that switching from
DB to 401(k) plans will increase the average retirement age by approximately 2 years.
13 A separate category for transition into unemployment was calculated, but these transition rates were so small that
they are excluded from the table for the sake of brevity.switch of employers may be required to access pension assets, workers with pensions should be
more likely to switch employers when they make the transition to part-time work.  Workers
without pension coverage would not  have the same incentive to switch employers.   To examine
this hypothesis, table 4 presents several additional statistics by lagged pension coverage status.
Panel (a)  shows that, conditional upon staying with the same employer between consecutive
waves,  pension covered workers are much less likely to switch from full-time to part-time work.
For example, among workers aged 62-64, who continue with the same employer, the percentage
who switch to part-time work among those without pension coverage in the prior wave is 15.4
percent.    The transition rate to part-time work among pension covered workers is  4.7 for  DB
coverage;   5.2 for DC coverage;  and 7.2 for  DBDC coverage.    Data on the other age groups
support the same conclusion -- pension coverage is associated with a lower chance of switching
from full-time to part-time work when the worker continues with the same employer. 
If pension coverage makes it difficult to switch to part-time work with the current
employer, initial pension coverage should make it more likely that workers switch employers
when they switch to part-time work.   Panel (b) of table 4 examines this hypothesis with data on
the percentage of workers who switch employers when they change from full-time to part-time
work.   While there are a few exceptions, for nearly every age group, pension covered workers
have a higher chance of switching employers than workers without pension coverage when they
switch to part-time work.   
While pensions might make it more likely that workers switch employers to get access to
part-time work, it is frequently argued that pensions (particularly DB plans) penalize quitters and
improve employee retention rates.
15   In the case of DB plans, pension wealth is usually
10 
15 For example, see Ippolito (1985) and Ippolito (1991). maximized if the worker leaves at either the early or normal retirement age.   Consequently, the
negative effect of pensions on turnover may diminish as the worker ages.
In many cases, a switch of employers will result in a pay cut since the value of any firm
specific skills is lost.   Since workers with pension coverage may have to switch firms to gain
access to their pension assets, they may be willing to switch employers even if they experience a
cut in pay.   Workers without pension coverage, however,  have less incentive to switch
employers as they phase into retirement.  Consequently, workers without pension coverage
should be less willing to switch employers if it involves a pay cut.
Data on the median changes in the real wage rate between waves of the HRS in Table 5
affirm the hypothesis that pension covered workers will take a larger wage cut when they switch
employers.
16   Among workers who  remain with the same employer between waves, the median
change in real wages varies between .68 and 1.35 percent across the 4 different pension
groupings.  This relatively modest wage growth among stayers is in stark contrast to the wage
experience of workers who switch employers.    The median worker who switches employers
experiences a sizable wage cut, particularly if they had a DB or DBDC plan originally.    The
median percentage point reduction  in wages for switchers is 18.4 for DB workers, 24.5 for
DBDC, 5.8 for DC and 1.5 for workers without pension coverage.    Workers with DB or DBDC
coverage realize larger wage cuts than either DC or non-pension workers.    If workers only
switch employers voluntarily, this suggests the DB and DBDC workers are willing to accept
larger pay cuts to facilitate a job switch.   Alternatively, if workers switch employers only if
11 
16 Respondents are asked how much their job pays. However, the rate of pay can be reported for various periods of
time, e.g., per hour per week, or per year. The hourly wage rate is calculated using measures of usual hours worked
per week, usual weeks worked per year, and pay rate, and adjusting appropriately for the periodicity of pay
reported.forced to do so, DB and DBDC workers are less able to locate employers who will match their
prior salary, perhaps because they have non-portable skills or  are included in a  pay contract that
either implicitly or explicitly pays in excess of productivity late in the career.
Table 5 also presents data on median change in annual work hours.    Consistent with the
earlier analysis on transitions to part-time work,  workers who stay with their employer between
waves experience a zero median change in annual hours worked, regardless of pension status.   
Among switchers, however, workers with pension coverage (particularly DB or DBDC) reduce
hours by a fairly substantial amount.   Workers without pension coverage in the prior wave have
a zero median change in annual hours.  Consequently, among workers who switch employers,  
prior pension coverage is associated with a larger decrease in work hours.
The analysis thus far  has found several patterns in the data that are consistent with the
hypothesis that pensions impede the transition from full-time to part-time work as workers
approach retirement.    First, among full-time workers, the chance that a worker switches to
part-time employment in a subsequent wave is lower among workers with pension coverage.   
Second,  among workers that remain with their same employer between waves, pension coverage
is associated with a lower chance of switching from full-time to part-time work.  Third, among
full-time workers who switch employers between waves, workers with pension coverage in the
prior period are more likely to make a switch to  part-time work   Finally, DB and DBDC
workers experience larger pay cuts than non-pension workers when they switch employers.   
Overall, the data are consistent with the premise that pensions are associated with a lower chance
of switching from full-time to part-time work without a change in employer, a greater chance
that a worker switches employers to accommodate a switch to part-time work, and a larger wage
reduction when a worker switches to part-time work.
12 5. Other Impediments to Phased Retirement.
While the patterns described in the prior section are all consistent with the hypothesis
that pensions make it more difficult for workers to phase into retirement without a switch of
employers, it is possible that pension coverage is merely proxying for other job characteristics
that either cause employers to place greater restrictions on work hours, or make employees less
willing to reduce hours.  As noted earlier, when a worker is in a job associated with greater
quasi-fixed labor costs, the employer will be less willing to allow part-time work because it
would  increase per hour labor costs unless the worker is willing to take a cut in the hourly wage
rate.  Inflexible work hours could also emerge when team production is important, or when
production technologies leave expensive capital idle when a person works part-time.
Alternatively, employees with pension coverage may have less desire to cut hours if it means
they will  lose health insurance coverage or other benefits, or if there are large fixed time or
money costs associated with working.  
To examine whether pension coverage is correlated with other job characteristics that
make it less likely that the employer will allow part-time work,  we make use of two questions in
the HRS.  The first asks "Could you reduce the number of hours in your regular work
schedule?"
17    The second asks  "Could you reduce to half-time or less?"  Table 6 reports the
percentage of full-time wage and salary workers who respond affirmatively to each question.    
While 35.9 percent of those without a pension report that they could reduce hours,  the
percentages are much lower for those with pension coverage (17.6 for DB; 25.8 for DC and 19.7
for DBDC).  Workers with pension coverage are more likely to be in jobs where the employer
13 
17 The question does not apply to a reduction in overtime hours.does not allow a switch to part-time work.    The fraction of workers who would be allowed to
cut to half-time work illustrates a similar pattern.  DB and DBDC workers are one-third as likely  
as non-pension workers to be allowed to cut to half-time work; DC workers are about one-half as
likely.
The fact that employers who provide pension coverage are less willing to allow workers
to cut hours suggests that the pension effects observed in the prior section could merely be
spurious correlation.    Perhaps the pension does not affect worker desires to cut to half-time at
all, but workers with pension plans are just more likely to have employers who are reluctant to
allow part-time work.    This underscores the importance of controlling for other characteristics
that might influence either worker desires for part-time work and employer willingness to allow
it.  
To examine the effect of pension coverage on employment transitions,  a multinomial
logit model of transition behavior is estimated.   The data is restricted to workers who are
full-time wage and salary workers in the first of any two consecutive waves.    Depending upon
the employment status reported in the second of two consecutive waves, the worker is classified
as making a transition from full-time employment to either full-time, part-time, or no
employment.     In addition to controls for the type of pension in the first of the two-periods, the
model controls for  employer willingness to allow a reduction to half-time work, the worker's
occupation and industry, earnings, education, marital and union status, race, sex, and health
insurance coverage, whether the worker has an employed spouse, and the size of the
establishment the worker is employed at.  
Table 7 provides the estimated effects from the logit model of transition behavior.   The
estimated marginal probability effect (MPE) for a given variable represents the effect of a one
14 unit change in that variable on the probability of a given outcome.
18    The MPE for the full-time
to full-time transition is omitted since it can be calculated as the sum of MPEs for the two other
transitions with the sign reversed.   
The empirical model of transition behavior suggests that all three types of pensions (DB,
DC, and DBDC) reduce the probability of making a transition from full-time to part-time work,
though the effect is statistically insignificant at the .05 level for  DBDC plans.  Compared to
workers without pension coverage, the probability that a worker makes a transition from
full-time to part-time work is 2.0  percentage points lower for workers with DB coverage and 1.5
percentage points lower for workers with DC coverage.  While the effect on the transition into
part-time work may seem small, only 6.4 percent of workers in the sample make the full-time to
part-time transition between waves.  
While all three types of pension coverage reduce the probability of making a transition
from full-time to part-time work,  this is more than offset by the increased probability of making
a transition into retirement for DB and DBDC plans.   DC plans, on  the other hand, reduce the
probability of switching to both part-time work and retirement.   The fact that DC plans
encourage a later retirement than DB plans is consistent with expectations.   Pension wealth
continues to accumulate in DC plans as long as a worker continues work.   In many DB plans,
pension wealth will decline if  a worker continues working with the same employer beyond the
early or normal retirement age.
Employer willingness to allow a switch to part-time work increases the chance that a
worker moves to part-time work and reduces the chance of retiring.    Consequently,  policies
15 
18 The marginal probability effects are estimated at the sample mean for all explanatory variables.   Greene (2003,
p. 722) describes how to calculate marginal probability effects and their standard errors using multinomial logit
coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix for the coefficients.that make it easier for workers to switch to part-time work may mean fewer years of full-time
work  financed by more years of part-time work. 
Consistent with expectations, the chance that a worker makes a switch from full-time to
part-time employment rises substantially with age.   Workers over age 65 are 5.6 percentage
points more likely to switch to part-time work  than a worker aged 50-54.  
If pensions make it difficult for workers to gradually reduce hours if they stay with the
same employer, workers with pensions should be less more likely to switch employers when they
switch to part-time work.   To investigate this hypothesis, the multinomial logit model of
employment transitions is estimated with employment transitions broken into five categories: (1)
full-time to full-time with same employer; (2) full-time to full-time with switch of employers; (3)
full-time to full-time with same employer; (4) full-time to full-time with switch of employers;
and (5) full-time to retirement.   The model includes the same controls as in table 7, but the
marginal probability effects are presented in table 8 for only a subset of the variables for the sake
of brevity.   
DB and DC pensions have negative effect on the probability that a worker makes a
switch to part-time work with the same employer yet has no statistically significant effect (at the
.10 level) on the probability that a worker switches to part-time work with a simultaneous change
of employer.  This behavior could be explained by restricted access to pension assets making it
difficult to switch to part-time work without switching employer.   
Not surprisingly, employer willingness to allow a switch to half-time work has a positive
effect on the probability that a worker switches to part-time work without a change of employer
and reduces the chance that a worker switches to retirement.   An unexpected result, however, is
that employer willingness to allow half-time work also increases the chance that a worker
16 simultaneously switches employers with the change to part-time work.   This result might mean
that workers who have skills that makes part-time work a viable option to their existing
employer find it easier to locate part-time work elsewhere.   For example, the  production
technology that makes it easy for cashiers to switch to part-time work with their current
employer may make it easy for cashiers to find part-time work elsewhere. 
A shortcoming inherent in these multinomial logit models of employment transitions is
that they restrict the effects of all the explanatory variables to be identical across pension types.
Since access to pension wealth can increase as a worker ages, pensions may have differential
effects on transition probabilities at different points in the life-cycle.   To allow for differential
effects, multinomial logit models of transition probabilities are estimated separately for workers
depending on the type of pension coverage.    To summarize the results, the models are then used
to simulate employment transitions for each type of pension coverage.   It is important to
emphasize that the entire population is used to estimate aggregate transition rates for a given
type of pension plan.   Consequently, differences in the simulated transition rates reflect
differences in the effect of pension type alone-- not differences in the types of workers covered
by a particular type of  pension.   
The results of the simulation,  summarized in figure 1, reveal that the probability of
switching to part-time work without a change of employer rises fairly sharply with age for
workers with no pension or DC pensions.   Workers with DB pensions, however, do not exhibit
this behavior.    In fact, for workers with DB pensions, the chance of a switch to part-time work
with the same employer is fairly stable as a worker ages.    Given that access to assets in some
DC plans improves when a worker reaches age 59 ½, one might expect that DC workers would
become more likely to switch to part-time work .   With DB plans, however, a worker must
17 switch employers to obtain access.  Consequently, worker aging in DB plans would not improve
the worker’s ability to access pension assets to accommodate their switch to part-time work with
the original employer.  
The simulation also suggests that the probability of  switching employers and reducing to
part-time work is fairly similar across pension types until the worker reaches age 65.  When
workers pass age 65, pension coverage is associated with a substantially higher chance of
switching employers and reducing to part-time work, though the difference is larger for DB than
DC plans.    This pattern could be explained by the fact that access to pension assets improves
more with worker aging under DC than DB plans.
7.  The Effect of Part-Time Work on Wages.
Several studies document that part-time work pays a lower hourly wage than full-time
work. 
19    Consequently, it is expected that workers who switch to part-time work will
experience reductions in their hourly wage.
20   If workers have firm-specific skills, a switch of
employers to accommodate a desired reduction in work hours would reduce wages even further.   
Consequently, if pension coverage increases the chance that a worker switches employers to
obtain part-time work, pension coverage may increase the size of the wage cut that workers
experience when they switch to part-time work. 
18 
20 The rate of pay can  be reported for various periods of time, e.g., per hour per week, or per year. The hourly
wage rate is calculated using measures of usual hours  worked per week, usual weeks worked per year, and the pay
rate, and adjusting  appropriately for the periodicity of pay reported.
19 See, for example, Blank (1990, 1998), Lettau (1997)  and Hirsch (2002).  To determine the effect of a switch to part-time work on hourly wages, we estimate a
regression model of the percentage change in the hourly wage rate between waves.   Given that
the hourly wage must be estimated by dividing annual earnings by annual hours, there is a good
deal of noise in our estimate.   To help reduce the influence of outliers on the regression
estimates, median regression models are employed.   The sample includes anyone who was a
full-time wage and salary worker in the first of two consecutive waves and continues either
part-time or full-time employment in the second wave.   The regression includes controls for
worker and job characteristics in the first of the two waves.  Dummy variables are included to
control for a switch of employers or a switch to part-time work.  Workers who remain with their
original employer as full-time workers are the reference group.   Dummies are included for  (i) a
switch to part-time work without switching employers; (ii) a switch to part-time work with a
switch of employers; and (iii) a switch of employers without a switch to part-time work.
Table 9 presents the results of the median wage change regressions.  Equations are
estimated separately for workers stratified according to their pension status in the first of two
consecutive waves of employment.
21 Using workers who remain with their original employer as
full-time workers as the benchmark, a switch to part-time work without switching employers has
no statistically significant effect (at the .10 level) on the hourly wage rate regardless of the type
of pension coverage.   On the  other hand, a switch to part-time work with a switch of employers
has a statistically significant negative effect for workers in any pension coverage category, but
the effects are much larger for those this with prior pension coverage than for those without.   A
switch to part-time work with a switch of employers reduces wages by over 30 percentage points
for workers with pension coverage.   For workers without pension coverage, the effect is 13
percentage point wage reduction.    The fact that pension covered workers realize a larger wage
19 
21 Standard errors are calculated with bootstrap methods using 500 draws.   cut when they switch employers as they cut back to part-time work is consistent with the premise
that pension covered workers are more willing to absorb a wage cut associated with a switch of
employers because it provides them access to pension wealth.   Alternatively, it is possible that
pension covered workers are more likely to experience large wage cuts when they switch
employers because they have more firm specific skills.    An obvious question is why they would
switch employers if it leads to such a large wage cut.  
8.  Summary and Conclusions.
This study has investigated the hypothesis that pension coverage may make it difficult for
workers to gradually phase into retirement by reducing hours worked.    The premise is that
restrictions on worker access to pension wealth without a switch of employers could make it
difficult for the worker to finance a switch to part-time work.    Workers with pension coverage
who wish to switch to part-time work may have to switch employers in order to access pension
wealth.
Analysis of data in the first four waves of the  HRS lends support for numerous
hypotheses that are consistent with the notion that pensions impede phased retirement.   First,
pension covered workers are less likely to switch to part-time employment as they approach
retirement age, but are more likely to switch directly from full-time work to no work.    This
result holds even after controlling for the original employer’s willingness to allow a reduction in
work hours and numerous firm and worker characteristics.   Second, when workers switch to
part-time work, those with pension coverage are more likely to make a switch of employers in
the process.    
20 While pension coverage reduces the chance that a worker switches to part-time
employment, there is strong evidence that numerous other factors play an important role.
Perhaps most importantly, nearly two-thirds of workers indicate their  employers are unwilling to
allow workers to switch to part-time work.    Our evidence suggests that if employers were more
flexible in allowing reduced work hours, workers would be more likely to switch to part-time
employment and retire at a later date.
Even after controlling for whether the employer would allow workers to switch to
part-time work, pension coverage impacts the chance of such a switch.    Pension coverage also  
increases the chance that a worker switches to part-time work if there is change of employers.    
Finally,  while pension coverage reduces the chance that workers switch employers when they
are in their 50s, the effect disappears when they are in their 60s.    All of these patterns support
the hypothesis that pensions reduce the chance of switching to part-time work, but increase the
chance that a worker switches employers to make a switch to part-time work.
The empirical analysis also reveals that that workers take substantial wage cuts when
they switch to part-time work, but only if the switch is simultaneous to a switch of  employers.    
While workers with and without pension coverage both take substantial wage cuts when they
switch employers and move to part-time work, the wage cuts are much larger for pension
covered workers.   This is consistent with the hypothesis that pension covered workers are more
willing to make a job change that involves a wage cut because of the importance of accessing
pension wealth.
In conclusion, our study finds substantial evidence that pensions do reduce the chance
that a worker will gradually phase into retirement.    Workers with pension coverage are more
likely to make a  switch directly from full-time employment into retirement.   To address
21 concerns that pensions impede phased retirement without a switch of employers, the Phased
Retirement Liberalization Act was proposed in 2000.  If adopted, the legislation would allow
pension payments to be made, even without a termination of employment, after the earlier of (a)
the normal retirement age defined in DB pensions; (b) age 59-1/2;  or (c) 30 years of service.   
The basic premise behind the legislation is that if workers could access their pension assets
without changing employers, fewer would have to switch employers in order to begin a gradual
reduction in their work effort.    Such legislation has the potential to increase the number of
workers who gradually phase into retirement and lead to later retirement ages.   It is less clear,
however, whether employers would support such legislation.   Given that many employers prefer
full-time over part-time employees, they may view such legislation as encouraging undesirable
behavior.  
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24 Note: The data source is the 1992 Health and Retirement Study. The sample is restricted to
full-time wage and salary workers aged 50 to 62.  
4423 Sample Size
20.4% Covered by a DB and a  DC Pension
22.1% Covered by only a DC Pension
30.1% Covered by only a DB Pension
72.5% Covered by a Pension
51.0 Weeks Worked Per Year
43.6 Hours worked per week
14.7 Years of Tenure




Table 1.  Sample Means for Wave I of Health and Retirement Survey.
25 Note: The sample is drawn from Waves 1 through 4 of the HRS with the sample restricted to
people who were full-time wage and salary workers aged 50 to 62 in Wave 1.  
15,678 3,440 3,734 4,057 4,447 Sample Size
-18.8% -23.3% -16.6% -17.4% -16.9% Change between
waves 1 and 4
81.2% 76.7% 83.4% 82.6% 83.1% 4
87.4% 82.5% 88.8% 90.1% 88.6% 3
93.0% 87.2% 96.3% 94.1% 95.1% 2
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1
Among Employed, Percent Full time
-33.7% -29.7% -38.7% -28.1% -37.7% Change between
waves 1 and 4
66.3% 70.3% 61.3% 71.9% 62.3% 4
77.0% 77.2% 75.7% 81.3% 74.5% 3
87.3% 86.5% 88.3% 89.1% 85.9% 2
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1
Percent Employed
All No pension Both  DB and DC Only DC Only DB Wave
Table 2.  Employment Status and Distribution of Hours and Weeks by Type of
Pension Coverage in Wave 1.
26 Note:  The sample is drawn from HRS waves 1 through 4. The transition rates are calculated
using people who are full-time wage and salary workers in the first of two consecutive waves of
the HRS and between the ages of 50 and 62 in wave 1.  
9,098 2,334 1,453 2,147 3,164 Sample Size
37.1% 26.4% 49.0% 29.9% 47.2% 65+
30.2% 22.4% 31.3% 27.9% 37.6% 62-64
12.9% 8.2% 13.6% 8.4% 19.7% 60-61
8.7% 8.9% 9.0% 5.2% 10.8% 55-59
5.0% 6.1% 4.9% 3.5% 5.2% 50-54
Full-Time to Out of Labor Force
14.3% 26.4% 11.5% 13.8% 6.8% 65+
9.9% 14.7% 6.8% 8.6% 8.5% 62-64
6.6% 9.4% 6.1% 6.1% 5.1% 60-61
5.0% 8.0% 3.0% 4.7% 4.2% 55-59
5.1% 10.4% 1.9% 4.2% 4.1% 50-54
Full-Time to Part-Time
47.3% 44.6% 39.5% 56.3% 44.3% 65+
58.4% 61.4% 61.3% 60.5% 53.3% 62-64
78.6% 78.4% 79.1% 84.3% 74.1% 60-61
84.8% 80.6% 87.3% 88.6% 83.9% 55-59
88.1% 80.5% 92.5% 91.0% 88.7% 50-54
Full-time to Full-Time
All No Pension Both DB and DC Only DC    Only DB Age Group 
Table 3. Transitions from Full-time Wage and Salary Employment by Pension
Type in Prior Wave.
27 Note:  The sample is drawn from HRS waves 1 through 4. The statistics are calculated using
people who are full-time wage and salary workers in the first of two consecutive waves of the
HRS and between the ages of 50 and 62 in wave 1.
9,098 2,334 1,453 2,147 3,164 Sample Size
47.1% 26.3% 100.0% 54.9% 70.7% 65+
50.7% 32.1% 34.2% 64.8% 70.4% 62-64
60.0% 54.7% 69.7% 53.7% 67.8% 60-61
56.9% 54.2% 71.2% 53.2% 58.0% 55-59
37.8% 39.2% 36.2% 11.3% 54.5% 50-54
(b) Among Those Switching from Full-Time to Part-Time, Percent Switching Employers
14.3% 32.2% 0.0% 10.3% 4.5% 65+
8.3% 15.4% 7.2% 5.2% 4.7% 62-64
3.5% 5.8% 2.4% 3.4% 2.2% 60-61
2.7% 5.3% 1.1% 2.7% 2.2% 55-59
3.9% 9.2% 1.3% 4.4% 2.2% 50-54
(a) Among Stayers, % Switching Full-time to Part-Time
All No Pension Both DB and
DC Only DC Only DB Age Group
Table 4. Full-time to Part-time Transitions by Pension Type in Prior Wave.
28 Note:  Sample includes people from HRS waves 1 through 4 who were full-time wage and salary
workers in the first of two consecutive waves and continued employment in the subsequent
wave.    
407 0 -1.51% No Pension
81 -416 -24.47% Both DB and DC
192 -120 -5.79% Only DC
182 -416 -18.39% Only DB
Workers Who Switch to Different Employer 
1,585 0 1.35% No Pension
1,164 0 0.78% Both DB and DC
1,668 0 1.21% Only DC
2,357 0 0.68% Only DB
Workers Who Stay with Same Employer




Table 5.  Median Changes in Hourly Wage for Stayers and Switchers.
29 Note: Sample restricted to full-time wage and salary workers from Waves 1 through 4 of
HRS. 
2,864 20.3% 2,915 35.9% No Pension
1,728 6.2% 1,740 19.7% Both DB and DC
2,665 11.6% 2,696 25.8% Only DC












Table 6.   Employer Willingness to Allow Reduced Work Hours.
30 Note:  The marginal probability effect (MPE) is the estimated effect of a one unit change in
the explanatory variable on the probability of a given type of transition.   The omitted
transition is from full-time employment to full-time employment.   The model also includes
controls for 13 industries and 17 occupations.
8,764 Sample size
13.7 6.4 Percent of sample making transition
-3.16 -0.029 -0.45 -0.003 Male
-0.81 -0.016 -1.15 -0.017 Other
0.08 0.000 -0.78 -0.006 Black
Race (white omitted
0.22 0.004 -2.05 -0.038 Never Married
-0.74 -0.007 1.70 0.011 Married 
Marital status (previously married
omitted)
1.16 0.009 0.60 0.004 Union coverage
0.55 0.006 -2.14 -0.016 Plant Size 500+
-1.25 -0.013 -1.60 -0.011 Plant Size 100 to 499
-1.52 -0.015 0.63 0.004 Plant Size 25 to 99
-1.37 -0.019 -0.03 0.000 16
-2.03 -0.024 0.57 0.005 13-15
-2.55 -0.024 0.19 0.001 12
Years of education
4.46 0.185 1.84 0.056 65 and over
15.13 0.186 6.39 0.057 62 to 64
17.20 0.167 6.20 0.045 60 to 61
3.85 0.034 2.59 0.015 55 to 59 
Age
2.72 0.000 3.30 0.000
Real Annual Earnings (in $100k)
Squared
-2.87 0.000 -2.32 0.000 Real Annual Earnings (in $100k)
7.79 0.003 0.46 0.000 Tenure
-1.71 -0.021 5.41 0.032 Employer allows half-time work
1.37 0.023 -1.24 -0.016 DB DC plan
-1.56 -0.015 -2.45 -0.015 DC plan
3.74 0.032 -3.31 -0.020 DB plan ( No Pension omitted)
t-statistic MPE t-statistic MPE
Full-time to retirement Full-time to part-time
Table 7.   Multinomial Logit Model of Employment Transitions.
31 Notes:   The marginal probability effect (MPE) is the estimated effect of a one unit change in
the explanatory variable on the probability of a given type of transition.   The omitted transition
is from full-time employment to full-time employment.   Models also include controls for all
variables listed in table 7.
8,285 Sample Size
14.5 3.1 3.3 79.1
Percent of sample making
transition 
-1.73 -0.023 4.39 0.015 2.20 0.011 -0.06 -0.001
Employer allows half-time
work
1.40 0.025 -0.57 -0.004 -1.26 -0.014 0.04 0.001 DB DC plan
-1.63 -0.017 -2.27 -0.008 -0.82 -0.004 3.14 0.039 DC plan
3.62 0.034 -3.92 -0.014 -0.52 -0.002 0.14 0.002
DB plan (Reference Group:
No Pension)








Transition from full-time employment to: 
Table 8.   Multinomial Logit Model of Employment Transitions Including
Switch of Employers.
32 Explanation:   Coefficient estimates are from median regression models explaining the percentage change in the hourly wage between
two consecutive waves in the HRS for workers who were employed full-time in the first wave and continued employment into the
second wave.   The models also control for worker and firm characteristics listed in table 7 and are estimated for subsamples for each
type of pension coverage.   The standard errors are generated with bootstrap methods using 500 replications.
1,689 1,047 1,540 2,073 sample size
0.7% 0.3% 0.5% 0.2% median wage change
0.27 0.00 -1.92 -0.11 -3.35 -0.06 -2.85 -0.08 full-time with different employer
-2.52 -0.13 -6.73 -0.55 -4.62 -0.32 -10.49 -0.52 part-time with different employer
1.68 0.03 0.33 0.06 0.07 0.00 1.18 0.06 part-time with same employer
Transition from full-time to
t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient
No Pension Coverage DBDC Coverage DC Coverage DB Coverage
Table 9.   Estimated Effects of Job Transitions on Wage Changes.  
33 Figure 1.   The Effect of Pensions on the 
Transition from Full-Time Employment
Explanation:  The figures present estimates of the average probability that a full-time wage and salary worker makes
a transition into one of 5 possible work states between consecutive waves of the HRS.   The estimates are derived
from multinomial logit models of transition probabilities estimated for sub-samples of the HRS based upon their
pension status as a full-time wage and salary worker.   Since the entire sample of full-time wage and salary workers
is used to generate the average transition probability for each pension type, the differences in transition probabilities
across pension type reflect only the effect of the pension.  The age groupings are based on the worker age in the first
of the two consecutive waves. 
34 